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An executor's account was filed in November, I881, and confirmed
absolutely in January, 1882. On April 3, 1893, one of the ceshui gue
trusts filed a petition for review. All the evidence alleged in support of
the petition was accessible to the petitioner in IS8I, and was then considered and made the subject of certain action agreed to between the
accountants and the trustee for petitioner's sister, who was another of the.
cestui que trusts. These facts although known in i881 to the petitioner's
trustee, who was also one of the accountants, were not actually brought
home to her until 1893. It was not alleged that any fraud was practiced
against petitioner's sister. Held, that the petitioner wasbarred by laches.
THE TIME LIMIT IMPOSED UPON BILLS OF REVIEW IN PENNSYLVANIA UNDER THE ACT OF 1840, WITH SOME CONSIDERATION OF THE PROCEDURE IN OTHER STATES.

Where a decree has been made by the Orphans' Court confirming the account of an executor, administrator or guardian,
no distribution having taken place under such decree, the
Orphans' Court has power under the Act of October 13, 1840,
to entertain a bill of review to correct such account, even
though five years have elapsed between the confirmation of
the account and the petition for review. In support see
George's Appeal, 12 Pa. 260 (1849); Gillen's Appeal, 8 W.
N. C. 499 (188o); Lightcap's Estate, 29 Pitts, Leg. Jour. 373
Reported in 13 Pa. C. C. Rep. 410.
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(1882); contra, Riddle's Estate, 19 Pa. 433 (1852); Kin-er's
Appeal, 62 Pa. 322 (1869); Jones's Appeal, 99 Pa. 129 (1881).
Prior to the Act of 1840, the power of the Orphans' Court
to entertain bills of review was subject to no limitations other
than such as arose in the discretion of the court, from the
circumstances ot the particular case in which the bill of review
was sought. The remedy is part of a general equitable jurisdiction exercised by the Orphans' Court, and derived from the
practice of the Court of Chancery. The nature of the discretion
exercised by the Orphans' Court in proceedings upon bills of
review is clearly shown in Briggs'sAppeal, 5 Watts. 94 (1836),
where Justice Sergeant said:
"The Orphans' Court, in analogy to the practice of chancery, has power, by a proceeding or petition in the nature of
a bill of review, to correct an account, after confirmation, for
errors apparent on its face, or new matter discovered since.
Great injustice might take place-if this power were denied
them. At the same time it is requisite that this discretion be
exercised with 'great caution, and only within a reasonable
time, otherwise accounts never would be at rest."
In this case it was held that the Orphans' Court, in the
exercise of its discretion, had power to order a review of
a guardian's account, although five years had elapsed since
confirmation on the ground of his omission to account for
money received-the omission having been newly discovered.
Following the decision in Briggs's Appeal, the Pennsylvania
Act of October 13, 184o, was passed (§ I, P. L. I ; Br. Purd.,
1286, § 61), providing that:
"The judg-es of the Orphans' Court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, withinfive years after the final decree, confirming
the orginal or supplementary account of any executor, administrator or guardian, which has or may be hereafter passed as
aforesaid, upon petitition of review being presented by.suct execufor, administrator or guardian, or their legal representatives, or
by any person interested therein, allegingerrors in such account,
which errors shall be specifically set forth in said petition of
review, and said petition and errors being verified by oath or
affirmation; said Orphans' Court shall grant a rehearing of so
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much of said account as is alleged to be errorin said petition of
revziew and give such relief asjustice and equity may require,by
reference to auditors, or otherwise; with like right of appeal to
the Supreme Court as in other cases, except that the appeal
shall be taken under the provisions of this Act, within one year
after the decree made on the petition of review:
"PROVIDED, That this Act shall not extend to any cause where
the balance found due shall have been actually paid and discharged by any executor, administratoror guardian."
"The judges of the Orphans' Court . . . within five years

shall grant a rehearing:" Act of Oct. 13, i84o.
This language is capable of two constructions: (I) Either
that the parties in interest must bring their bill of review within
fiveyears or not at all; (2) Or, that it is obligatoiy upon the
court to grant a rehearing within fivejears, and, in its discretion, to grant or refuse such rehearing after five years. In
either event, under this latter construction, the parties in interest
have the right to present theirpetitionfor review.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court, in the cases of
Riddle's Estate and Jones's Appeal, refers to the Act of I84o as
fixing a limitation to petitions of review, and Justice Sharswood, in Kinter's Appeal, said: "The object of that Act
(1840) seems to have been to make a bill of review in the
Orphans' Court a matter of right, and, at the same time, prescribe a limitation of time to the exercise of the power."
On the other hand the court, in George's Appeal, declared
the limitation of five years applicable only "to reviews of
alleged errors in the settled accounts of executors, etc."
In Gillen's Appeal, the court said: "The Act 6f October 13,
184o, is an enlarging, not a restraining statute." And, further: "The only effect of that Act (1840) was to make it
peremptory on the court to grant the review in the cases
within the purview, with the proviso that it should not apply
to any case where the balance shall have been actually paid
hy the executor or administrator."
And in Lightcap's Estate Justice Green held that the Orphans'
Court had discretionary power to correct its own errors by petition of review outside of the provisions of the Act of 1840.
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Weitting v. Nissley, 6 Pa. 143 (1847), was decided under theproviso of the Act.
The court said: "In the present case the account was confirmed on the 12th of February, 1839, and by the decree of
the Orphans' Court made, the account must be regarded as the
final account, on the authority of Bowers's Appeal, 2 Barr. 432,
and not having been appealed from within three years, nor a.
review asked for within five years, it is final and conclusive;
and should there be errors in the account, as is alleged, theycannot be corrected either in the present form of proceeding,.
or by a petition for a review.
"Whatever may have been the practice in relation'to open-.
ing and correcting such accounts, and the time during which.
it would be allowed, we regard the question now settled bythe Act of October 13, 184o.

"By the Act of March 29, 1832 (Purd. 885), the Orphans"
Court is declared to be a court of record, with all the qualities.
and incidents of courts of record at common law . . . and by

the Act of October 13, 184o, relating to Orphans' Courts, a.
review may be granted in a proper case made out withih five
years after the final settlement of account

. . . These acts,.

whilst they give to the vigilant every means of redress necessary for their protection, fix a period when all litigation is at.
an end."
In this case there had been a final accounting and payment.
by the administrator and releases in full delivered to him by
appellant.
In White's Estate, 49 Leg. Int: 286 (1892), the court said:
"The Act of Assembly is explicit that a review shall not be
granted after a fund is distributed."
In George's Appeal, 12 Pa. 26o (1849), the court said::
"The Orphans' Court has from the beginning exercised the
power of reviewing and modifying its proceedings and decrees,
as an authority necessarily inherent and essential to the right
discharge of its duties: On this point no statutory direction
was given till the Act of October, i84o, which, however, is confined to reviews of alleged errors in the SETTLED ACCOUNTS of'
executors, administratorsand guardians. This limits the period
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-within which a review may be had in such cases to five years,
but it leaves untouched the pre-existing practice in all other
instances. Being thus unrestrained by the written law, I see
no objection to the liberal exercise of the right to rehear and
redress for the correction of manifest mistake involving injury,
tempered, however, by the application of a sound discretion,
seeking to protect the rights of third persons, and which, in
most cases, would dictate a refusal to interfere when the relative position of the original parties was materially changed, or
the interests of third persons might be put to hazard. In
estimating such a contingency, the time which had elapsed
sifice the decree complained, would, of course, enter largely
into the consideration of the court; and where this was much
extended, might of itself afford a sufficient objection to bar the
prayer for relief. It is said that, in England, in the time of
Lord Guildford, there was no limitation for a bill of review:
Fetton v. Hocclesfield, I Veru. 287; though in Goddard v.
Goddard, Ch. Rep. 139, it was not permitted sixteen years
after a decree, and it now seems to be the rule not to reverse
on review after twenty years, except for very apparent error."
. . . "Should it become necessary with us to fix the time
within which a review may be granted, the period will probably
be much abridged by reference to our Acts of 1791, prohibiting writs of error after seven years, or, it may be, to the
Act of I84o, just mentioned."
In Riddle's Estate, 19 Pa. 433 (1852), Lewis, J., said:
"Thre Act of October 13, r8.4o, which fixes a limitation to
petitions of review, directs the court to 'give such relief as justice and equity may require.' This ma' be. understood as
adopting the principles of equity which had heretofore governed Courts of Chancery in applications of this kind. It was
certainly not the intention of the Legislature to keep litigation
on foot for a longer period than necessary for the purposes of
justice; or to nullify the solemn decisions of the courts'at the
mere will and pleasure of any party who -chose to demand a
rehearing, within five years, upon the same questions of fact
which had been fully heard and decided on the first trial. To
allow this to a party who cannot allege any error in law
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on the face of the decree, or that he has discovered any new
evidence, or that any new matter has arisen, would be contrary to the maxim that ' no one shall be twice vexed for the
same cause,' and would not be administering 'justice' or
* 'equity.'"
This case decides that a review could only be had as a
matter of right in two cases: (i) For error of law appearing
in the body of the decree; (2) For new matter which has
arisen subsequent to the decree.
In Kinters Appeal, 62 Pa. 322 (1869), Sharswood, J., said:
"Nor in our opinion does the proviso of the Act of October
13, 184o, § i, Pamph. L. i, apply. The objeit of that Act
seems to have been to make a bill of review in the Orphans'
Court a matter of right, and at the same time prescribeda limitation -of time to the exercise of the power. It was probably
passed in consequence of the decision of this court in Briggs's
Appeal, 5 Watts, 91, where, in a .case like that before us, it
was held that the Orphans' Court, in the exercise of its discretion, had power to order a review of a guardian's account, on
the ground of money having been received by him and not
accounted for, the omission having been newly discovered.
"At the same time," said Mr. Justice Sergeant, "it is requisite7
that this discretion be exercised with great caution, and only
within a reasonable time; otherwise accounts never would be
at rest." We must construe the Act of 184o in the light of
the old law, the mischief and the remedy. It never could have
been the design of the Legislature to provide that where an
accountant had failed to charge himself with money for which
he was liable to account, that the payment of the balance.
should preclude a re-examination. We must give the law a
reasonable interpretation-one in accordance with its spirit,
and not its letter. The body of the Act expressly declares
that the court shall "give such relief as justice and equity may
require." In a great majority of cases this could Aot be done
if the payment of the.balance was a bar to all inquiry. Such a
rule would be a cover to the grossest frauds purposely concealed. It was meant as a shield to the honest accountant,
not as a weapon in the hands of the dishonest to perpetrate
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iniquity. Its evident purpose was that the decree should never
be disturbed so as to do injustice to the accountant. If under
it he had paid over money he ought to be protected in that
payment, even though it should subsequently appear to have
been wrongful. Whenever, therefore, the object of the review is
to surcharge the accountant with money received by him, not
accountedfor, and,therefore, not at all included in the decree,
and not to disturb an appropriationalready decreed andconsummated by payment, the proviso of the Act of i8lo, is not in the
way of the proceeding."
This case decides that the proviso of the Act of 184o applies
to' accounts confirmed by decree and consummated by payment, and not to an attempt to surcharge an accountant with
money received by him and not accounted for, and therefore
not included in the decree of the court. Justice Sharswood's
comments upon the object of the Act of 1840, beyond the
decision as to the meaning of the proviso as above, were not
in any manner necessary t6 the decision of the case, and must,
therefore, be regarded as mere dicta.
In Bucknor's Estate, 7 W. N. C. 471 (1879), the court said :
"It must be conceded that the petition could not be supported
under the Act of October 13, 1840. But the power of the
Orphans' Court to correct or amend its decrees when injustice
will result by suffering them to stand, does not depend entirely
upon this Act; and where no rights have changed in consequence of the decree, this power of correction or amendment
will be liberally exercised, notwithstanding the fact that error
does not appear on the face of the record, or that new matter
is not averred or shown."
In Gillen's Appeal, 8 W. N. C. 499 (I88O), the court said:
"Power to grant a bill of review has always been a well-established branch of the authority of a Court of Chancery, and has
been exercised by the Orphans' Court: Briggs's Appeal,
5 Watts. 91.
The Act of October zj, z84o, is an enlarging, not a restraining statute.
Excepting under certain circumstances, the court skall grant
a bill of review: George's Appeal, 2 Jones, 262; Bishop's
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Estate, io B. 471 ; Pennypacker's Appeal, I Leg. Gaz. R. 484.
On appeal,the Supreme Court,inthe course of their opinion,
said: "Undoubtedly, prior to the Act of October 13, 184o,
the Orphans' Court might entertain a petition of review in
cases in which Chancery Courts were in the practice of so
doing. The only effect of that Act was to make it perem tory
on the court to grant the review in the cases within the purview,
with the proviso that it should not apply to any case where the
balance shall have been actually paid.by the executor or administrator."
In Littleton's Appeal, 93 Pa. 181, the court said: "In New
York it is held that a bill of review cannot be brought after
the time allowed for an appeal: Boyd v. Vanderkemp, I Barb.
Ch. R. 273. Perhaps in this State it would be wise to follow
the rules established by the Legislature as to reviews of final
decrees confirming the original or supplementary account of
any executor, administrator or guardian, by the Act of October 13, 1840, § I, Pamph. L. 1841, pl. I, which is five years.
This, however, would be only by analogy, for it is clear that
the Act of 184o is not directly applicable. Yet in George's
Appeal, 2 Jones, 262, Mr. Justice Bell says, 'should it
become necessary with us to fix the time within w4hich a
review may be granted, the period will probably be much
abridged by reference to our Act of 1791, prohibiting writs
of error after seven years' (now reduced to two years by Act
of April I, 1874, Pamph. L. 50), or it may be the Act of
1840 just mentioned."
In Jones's Appeal, 99 Pa. 129 (1881), the court said: "The
Act qf October 13, i84o, not only gives the right of review to a
party in interest upon proper showing, but fixes a limitation to
petitions of review. . . . Whether the review is demandedfor
error in law apparent in the decree, or for new matter which
has arisen after the decree, or for new proof that has come to
light since the decree, the statutory limit applies."
InlViilne's Appeal,.II W. N. C. 332 (1882), the court said:
"We have no doubt about the power of the Orphans' Court
to revise and correct its former adjudications, if in those
adjudications it discovered a palpable mistake, produced either
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by its own inadvertence or by the blunder of the parties. A
sense of fair dealing and justice would be authority enough,
in the absence of any other, for so holding. Nevertheless,
other authority will be found, and that directly in point, in
Genge's Appeal, 2 Jones, 260, where the subject is so fully
discussed that further argument from us is unnecessary."
In In re Estate of G. C. Lightcap, Sr., deceased, 29 Pitts.
Leg. Jour. (0. S.) 373 (1882), 99 Pa. 74, the Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Green, J., said: "It cannot be doubted that the
court below had ample power to correct the error of its original
decree, either under or independently of the Act of October z3,
z8"o. Nothing had been done under the decree, and if it was
erroneous it ought to be corrected in the interest ofjusticeand
by the court that made it. We held in Parker'sAppeal, i I
P. F. Smith, 478, that the Orphans' Court under the Act of
October I3, 184o, might entertain a bill of review, notwithstanding a decree of affirmance by the Supreme Court. The
discretionary power of the Orphans' Court to correct its own
errors by petition of reviev, outside of the proviszons of the Act
of i84o, has been affirmed in the cases of Gillen's Appial,
8 W. N. C. 499, and Whelan's Appeal, 20 P. F. Smith, 4o,
and is inanifest upon plain princi les applicable to the power of
all courts over their own decrees."
Rhone's Orphans' Court, Pr. Vol. I, p. 645, says: "The
object and purpose of the Act of October 13, I84O, was to
establish as a matter of right what had been before construed
by the courts as matters of grace, and to limit the time for the
inquiry and examination of accounts to five. years after their
final confirmation:" Ellison's Estate, 13 C. C. R. 410 (1893).
In this case an executor's account was filed in I88i and
confirmed absolutely in 1882. In 1893 one of the cestui que
trusts filed a petition for review. Held,that under the evidence
the petitioner was barred by laches.
In the course of his opinion, Judge Ashman said: "The rule
is that laches will bar a suitor of his remedy as effectually as
thle statute of limitations, and for the same reason, his own
inaction raising the identical presumption which the law raises
out of mere lapse of time. In recognition of this rule the Act
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of October 13, 184o, limited the period within which, as:
a matter -of right, a bill of review can be had to five years.
from the date of the final decree. Among cases not within,
the Act, where relief has been sought as a matter of grace, and
has been refused upon the ground of laches, we may refer to
Baggs's Appeal, 43 Pa. 5.12 ; Miligan'sAppeal, 82 Pa. 389;:
and Scott's Appeal, 112 Pa. 427."
The foregoing examination of the Pennsylvania authorities.
on this subject shows how decided'a preponderance exists in.
the decisions of our Supreme Court in favor of a liberal inter-pretation of the Act. This power of review, which- any other
construction of the Act of 184o than the one here contended
for .would materially and arbitrarily curtail, is one of the most.
delicate and important among those entrusted to the Orphans'
Court in its equitable jurisdiction over decedents' estates.
Prior to the Act of 184o, the question as to the period of
time which by its lapse would constitute a bar to review, was
entrusted to the discretion of the court, to be determined by
all the circumstances of the case, and the discretion thus vested
in the'Orphans' Court had always been guardedly and equitably,
exercised.
The intent of the Legislature in the passage of this Actcould never have been to limit to the short term of five years
the exercise of a power which, prior thereto, the court had.
equitably administered after a lapse of twenty years. Apart
from the authorities, a consideration of the causes for which.
bills of review are filed, and of the injustice which so narrow a
limitation of the power would produce, will convince that such.
was not the purpose of the Act.
The end sought by the Legislature was plainly
to secure
the privilege of review as a matter of right demandable by theparties in interest within the period of five years, and demandable thereafter subject, as formerly, to the equitable discretion
of the court.
And this conclusi6n to which these considerations so clearly
point is borne out and confirmed by the opinions of the SupremeCourt in George's Appeal, Gillen's Appeal and Lightcap'sEstate.
In Jackson v.Jackson, 144 Ill. 274 (1893), one of the points.
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involved in the case was the question under discussion, thebill of review being brought to vacate a decree in a partition.
proceeding. Justice Craig, in delivering the opinion of theSupreme Court of Illinois, said: "The next question presented is, whether the complainants or either of them havelost their right to bring this bill by lapse of time. As has
been seen, the decree was rendered on April 6, 1883, and
this bill was brought on August 20, I89O. No time has.
been prescribed by statute within which a bill of review must
be brought, but writs of error are required to be sued out
within five years from the time a judgment or decree las been
rendered; and in analogy to the time prescribed for prosecuting writs of error, it has been held that a bill of this character should be brought within the time allowed for suing out a
writ of error-: Lyon v. RobMbns, 46 Ill. 278." And the same.
view was taken in the case under consideration.
In the case of Thomas v. Harvie's Heirs, io Wheaton, I43(1825), this question was considered by Mr. Justice Washing-ton in rendering the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States. This was an appeal from the Circuit Court ofKentucky. The appellant filed in 1818 a bill to review and
reverse a final decree of the same court pronounced in 181o.
The Supreme Court said: "The recoi-d shows that the order
of court permitting the bill to be filed was granted eight
years subsequent to the final decree in the original cause;:
and the question to be decided is, whether the remedy was not
barred by length of time?"
"It must be admitted, that bills of revirew are not- strictly
within any act of limitations prescribed b_ Congress; but it.
is unquestionable that Courts of Equity, acting upon the prin- ciple that laches and neglect ought to be discountenanced, and:
that in cases of stale demands its aid ought not to be afforded,.
have always interposed some limitation to suits brought in,
those courts. It is stated by Lord Camden, in the case of*
Snitl v. Clay (Ambl. 645, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 639, note) "that
as the Court of Equity has no legislative authority, it could
not properly define the time of bar by a positive rule, but that,
as often as parliament had limited the time. of actions and reme-
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dies to a certain period in legal proceedings, the Court of
Chancery adopted that rule, and applied it to similar cases in
equity." Upon this principle it is, that an account for rents
and profits, in a common case, is not carried beyond six years,
or a redemption of mortgaged premises allowed after twenty
years possession by the mortgagee, or a bill of review enter-tained after twenty years, by analogy to the statute which
limits writs of error to that period.
These principles' seem to apply, with peculiar strength to
bills of review, in the courts of the United States, from the circumstance that Congress has thought proper to limit the time
within which appeals may be taken in equity causes, thus
creating an analogy between the two remedies by appeal, and
a bill of review, so appareht that the court is constrained to
consider the latter as necessarily comprehended within the
equity of the provision respecting the former." And in Central Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, et al., 135 U. S.
207 (189o), the principles laid down in Thomas v. Harvie's
-Heirswere adVerted to and re-affirmed.
In an action of accounting a court of equity will not lend its
aid to the enforcpment of stale claims. In the case of Bell
et al. v. Hudson et al., 73 Cal. Rep. 285 (1887), it was .held
that a Court-of Equity, on account of the staleness of the
claim, would not entertain an action for an accounting of the
affairs of a partnership, which was brought by the personal
representative of one partner, twenty-five years after his death,
against the personal representative of the other, when the complainant failed to account for the delay by showing that the
heirs of the former partner had no knowledge of their rights,
or that there was some impediment to a prior action by them.
In perhaps the majority of the States there is no statute of
limitations governing such cases-certainly no such statute as
the Pennsylvania Act of. 184o-and the entertainment and
-decision of such cases is left entirely to the discretion of the
,Court of Equity before which they are brought. The general
attitude is well set forth by Chief Justice Taney, in delivering
the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in
McKnight v. Taylor, I How. 168:
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"In matters of account, where they are not barred by the
Act of Limitations, Courts of Equity refuse to interfere after a
considerable lapse of time, from considerations of public policy,
and from the difficulty of doing entire justice when the original
transactions have become obscured by time and the evidence
may be lost."
As stated by Davis, J., in McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. I9,
"there is no artificial rule on such a subject, but each case as
it arises must be determined by its own particular circumstances." In other words, the question is addressed to the
sound discretion of the chancellor in each case. How clearly
this doctrine appears in some cases is illustrated in the above-.
cited case of McKnight v. Taylor, where the bill was filed to
adjust matters of account which were not barredby the Statute
of Limitations, but were, nevertheless, dismissed for want of
reasonable diligence.
The principle to be deduced from the cases not governed by
statute seems to be that a bill of review for error apparent on
the record must be brought within the time in which, at the
common law, a writ of error could be brought, and that the
allowance of a bill of review for after-discovered matter is.
wholly within the equitable discretion of the court as to the
question of time, as well as in other respects.
It appears that, as a general rule, it is not allowed after the
time allowed for a writ of error has elapsed since the evidence
was discovered. The whole subject is one which the Legislatures of our States will do well to leave to the sound discretion
of our Courts of Equity as any attempt at statutory limitation
of a power so delicate, so important and so necessarily discretionary, cannot but be frequently attended with mischievous.
results.
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